Abstract. This paper presents three new attacks on the RSA cryptosystem. The first two attacks work when k RSA public keys (Ni, ei) are such that there exist k relations of the shape eix − yiφ(Ni) = zi or of the shape eixi − yφ(Ni) = zi where Ni = piqi, φ(Ni) = (pi − 1)(qi − 1) and the parameters x, xi, y, yi, zi are suitably small in terms of the prime factors of the moduli. We show that our attacks enable us to simultaneously factor the k RSA moduli Ni. The third attack works when the prime factors p and q of the modulus N = pq share an amount of their least significant bits (LSBs) in the presence of two decryption exponents d1 and d2 sharing an amount of their most significant bits (MSBs). The three attacks improve the bounds of some former attacks that make RSA insecure.
Introduction
The RSA cryptosystem [14] is currently the most widely known and widely used public key cryptosystem. The main parameters in RSA are the RSA modulus N and the public exponent e. The modulus N = pq is the product of two large primes of equal bit-size and e satisfies gcd(e, φ(N )) = 1 where φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1) is the Euler totient function. The integer d satisfying ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N )) is the private exponent. The RSA cryptosystem is deployed in various application systems for encryption, signing and for providing privacy and ensuring authenticity of digital data. Therefore, most research is focused on reducing the encryption/decryption execution time or the signature verification/generation time. For example, to reduce the decryption time or the signature generation time, one may wish to use a small private exponent d. Unfortunately, based on the convergents of the continued fraction expansion of e N , Wiener [19] showed that the RSA cryptosystem is insecure when d < N 1/4 . Boneh and Durfee [3] proposed an extension of Wiener's attack that allows the RSA cryptosystem to be broken when d < N 0.292 . Their Method is based on lattice basis reduction techniques. Similarly, Blömer and May [2] proposed an extension of Wiener's attack and showed that the RSA cryptosystem is insecure if there exist three integers x, y and z satisfying ex − yφ(N ) = z with x < and |z| < exN −3/4 . Their method combines lattice basis reduction techniques and the continued fraction algorithm. In general, the use of short secret exponent encounters serious security problem in various instances of RSA. A typical example is when a single user generates many instances of RSA (N, e i ) with the same modulus and small private exponents [8] . Another example is when a single user generates k instances of RSA (N i , e i ), each with the same small private exponent d. Using k equations e i d − k i φ(N i ) = 1, Hinek [6] showed that it is possible to factor the k modulus N i if d < N δ with δ = k 2(k+1) − ε where ε is a small constant depending on the size of max N i . Similarly, to improve the computational efficiency of server-aided signature generation (see [16] ), one may use RSA with a modulus N = pq such that the prime factors p and q share a large number of least significant bits (LSBs). The security of this variant of RSA has been analyzed under the partial key exposure attacks in [16] , [17] , [20] , and [18] . In [18] , Sun et al. showed that RSA is more vulnerable in the situation when p and q share a large number of LSBs than the standard scenario when the prime factors p and q differ in the first LSBs. When e = N γ , they showed that RSA is vulnerable if |p − q| = 2 m x with 2 m = N α and d < N δ whenever δ < (1 − 4α)(1 − 4α + 6γ). For example, if γ = 1, and α = 0.2, then δ < 0.662, that is, RSA is insecure if the private exponent is such that d < N 0.662 . In [8] , Howgrave-Graham and Seifert extended Wiener's attack in the presence of many decryption exponents for a single RSA modulus. They showed that RSA is insecure if one knows two public exponents e 1 and e 2 such that the corresponding private exponents d 1 and d 2 satisfy d 1 , d 2 < N 0.357 . In [11] , Sarkar and Maitra improved this bound up to
In this paper, we present three new attacks on RSA. The first attack works for k ≥ 2 moduli N i = p i q i , i = 1, . . . , k, when k instances (N i , e i ) are such that there exist an integer x, k integers y i , and k integers z i satisfying e i x − y i φ(N i ) = z i . We show that the k RSA moduli N i can be factored in polynomial time if N = min i N i and
.
The second attack works when the k instances (N i , e i ) of RSA are such that there exist an integer y, and k integers x i , and k integers z i satisfying e i x i −yφ(N i ) = z i . Similarly, we show that the k RSA moduli N i can be factored in polynomial time if N = min i N i , min i e i = N α , and
In both scenarios, we transform the equations into a simultaneous diophantine problem and apply lattice basis reduction techniques to find the parameters (x, y i ) or (y, x i ). This leads to a suitable approximation of p i + q i which allows us to apply Coppersmith's method [4] to compute the prime factors p i and q i of the moduli N i . The third attack enables us to factor an RSA modulus N = pq when the prime factors share their LSBs in the presence of two public exponents e 1 and e 2 such that the corresponding decryption exponents d 1 and d 2 share their MSBs.
To be more precise, suppose that e = N γ , |p − q| = 2 m x with 2 m = N α , and
We show that one can factor the RSA modulus if
As an example, observe that, in the situation that γ = 1, α = 0.2, and β = δ, that is d 1 and d 2 differ in the first MSBs, then the condition (1) gives δ < 0.736 which improves the bound δ < 0.662 obtained in [18] . On the other hand, in the standard situation γ = 1, α = 0, and β = δ, that is when the prime integers p, q do not share any LSBs and d 1 , d 2 do not share any MSBs, the condition (1) gives δ < 0.422 which also improves the bound δ < 0.416 found in [11] . Our method is based on Coppersmith's method for solving polynomial equations The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the tools that we apply in the scenarios, namely Coppersmith's method, lattice basis reduction and simultaneous diophantine approximations. We also present some useful results that will be used through the paper. In Section 3, we present the first attack. In Section 4, we present the second attack and in Section 5, we present the third attack. We conclude in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we give some basics on Coppersmith's method, lattice basis reduction techniques and simultaneous diophantine equations that will be used in this paper.
Coppersmith's method
At Eurocrypt'96, Coppersmith [4] proposed an algorithm for finding small roots of bivariate integer polynomial equations in polynomial-time. The algorithm is based on the LLL algorithm [10] for lattice reduction. A clever application of Coppersmith's algorithm is to factor an RSA modulus N = pq when half of the least significant or most significants bits of p are known.
Theorem 1 (Coppersmith) . Let N = pq be the product of two unknown integers such that q < p < 2q. Given an approximation of p with additive error term at most N 1 4 , then p and q can be found in polynomial time.
Coppersmith's method has been heuristically extended to many variables. To find the small roots of a multivariate polynomial f (x 1 , · · · , x n ), we construct a set of coprime polynomials with small coefficients which contain the same roots over the integers. This can be done by applying the LLL algorithm to a lattice that can be built using the strategy of Jochemsz and May [9] . To this end, a practical way is the use the following result of Howgrave-Graham [7] .
. . , n, and
Then h x
n = 0 holds over the integers.
To find the small roots of the first polynomials of the LLL-reduced basis, we can use Gröbner bases or evaluation of resultants.
Lattice reductions and simultaneous diophantine approximations
Let u 1 . . . , u d be d linearly independent vectors of R n with d ≤ n. The set of all integer linear combinations of the vectors u 1 . . . , u d is called a lattice and is in the form
where U is the the matrix of the u i 's in the canonical basis of R n . Define v to be the Euclidean norm of a vector v ∈ L. A central problem in lattice reduction is to find a short non-zero vector in L. The LLL algorithm of Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lovász [10] produces a reduced basis and answers positively but partially this problem. The following result fixes the sizes of the reduced basis vectors (see [12] ). Theorem 3. Let L be a lattice of dimension ω with a basis {v 1 , . . . , v ω }. The LLL algorithm produces a reduced basis {b 1 , · · · , b ω } satisfying
One important application of the LLL algorithm is that it provides a solution to the simultaneous diophantine approximations problem which is defined as follows. Let α 1 , . . . , α n be n real numbers and ε a real number such that 0 < ε < 1. A classical theorem of Dirichlet asserts that there exist integers p 1 , · · · , p n and a positive integer q ≤ ε −n such that
In 1982, Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász [10] described a method to find simultaneous diophantine approximations to rational numbers. In their work, they considered a lattice with real entries. We state below a similar result for a lattice with integer entries.
Theorem 4 (Simultaneous Diophantine Approximations).
There is a polynomial time algorithm, for given rational numbers α 1 , . . . , α n and 0 < ε < 1, to compute integers p 1 , · · · , p n and a positive integer q such that
Proof. See Appendix A.
Primes sharing LSBs
The following lemma is reformulation of a result of [15] . It concerns an RSA modulus N = pq when the prime factors p and q share an amount of their LSBs.
Lemma 1.
Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Suppose that p − q = 2 m u for a known value m. Then p = 2 m p 1 + u 0 and q = 2 m q 1 + u 0 where u 0 is a solution of the equation
Proof. See Appendix B.
Approximations of the primes in RSA
Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Then p + q satisfies the following inequalities (see [13] )
The following result shows that any approximation of p + q will lead to an approximation of p.
Lemma 2. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Suppose we know an approximation S of p + q such that S > 2N 1 2 and
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 1. Notice that in Section 4.1.2 of the ANSI X9.31:1998 standard for public key cryptography [1] , there are a number of recommendations for the generation of the primes in N = pq. One criteria is that the primes p, q shall satisfy p − q > 2 −100 √ N . Combining with (2) when q < p < 2q and N > 2 1024 , this implies that the term
This shows that, when N = pq > 2 1024 and the prime factors p and q are chosen following the ANSI X9.31:1998 standard, the approximation extra term
The First Attack on k RSA Moduli
In this section, we are given k ≥ 2 moduli N i = p i q i with the same size N . We suppose in this scenario that the RSA moduli satisfy k equations e i x−y i φ(N i ) = z i . Notice that the parameters φ(N i ) = (p i − 1)(q i − 1) are also unknown. We show that it is possible to factor the RSA moduli N i if the unknown parameters x, y i and z i are suitably small.
such that
Proof. For k ≥ 2 and i = 1, . . . , k, the equation
Let N = min i N i and suppose that y i < N δ and |z i | < pi−qi
N , we will get
Plugging in (3), we get
We now proceed to prove the existence of the integer
It follows that the conditions of Theorem 4 are fulfilled which will find x and y i for i = 1, . . . , k. Next, using the equation e i x − y i φ(N i ) = z i , we get
yi is an approximation of p i + q i with an error of at most pi−qi
Lemma 2, we can find an approximationP i =
. . , k, we find p i using Theorem 1. This leads to the factorization of the k RSA moduli N 1 , . . . , N k .
Remark 2.
It is conjectured in [3] that an RSA instance with a modulus N = pq and a public exponent e is insecure if ed − yφ(N ) = 1 with d < N 1/2 . This conjecture can be related to Theorem 5 as follows. Suppose that k RSA moduli N 1 , · · · , N k and k public exponents e 1 , . . . , e k satisfy e 1 d−y 1 φ(N 1 ) = 1 and
. Then, by Theorem 5, one can factor the RSA moduli N 1 , · · · , N k . Observe that, for sufficiently large k, we have δ ≈ (11) with n = k = 3, we find
Consider the lattice L spanned by the matrix
Then, applying the LLL algorithm to L, we get a reduced basis with the matrix 
The Second Attack on
Proof
Let N = max i N i . Suppose that y < N δ and |z i | < pi−qi
√ N i , then we get
Using this in (4), we get
We now proceed to prove the existence of y and the integers x i . Let ε = √ 5N
Then, since 5
It follows that the conditions of Theorem 4 are fulfilled and we will obtain y and x i for i = 1, . . . , k. Next, by utilizing the equation e i x i − yφ(N i ) = z i , we get
Since |z i | < Then N = max(N 1 , N 2 , N 3 ) = 701404527220444023808491592451. We also get min(e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ) = N α with α ≈ 0.9791. Since k = 3, we get δ =
2(k+1) = 0.359325 and ε = √ 5N δ+1/2−α ≈ 0.000595. Using (11) with n = k = 3, let
Consider the lattice L spanned by the the rows of the matrix
Then, applying the LLL algorithm to L, we get a reduced basis with the matrix From the first row, we deduce y = 9963214223, x 1 = 11669001827, x 2 = 17178297583, and x 3 = 11494200282. Using y and x i for i = 1, 2, 3, define
. We get 
The Third Attack on RSA With Primes and Decryption Exponents Sharing Bits
In this section, we present the attack which applies when the prime factors of an RSA modulus share an amount of their LSBs in the presence of two decryption exponents d 1 and d 2 sharing an amount of their MSBs.
The attack
Theorem 7. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus such that p − q = 2 m u where 2 m ≈ N α . Let e 1 and e 2 be two public exponents satisfying e 1 , e 2 ≈ N γ ,
Proof. Suppose that e 1 and e 2 are two public exponents satisfying
Multiplying the first equation by e 2 and the second by e 1 and subtracting, we get
Suppose that p − q = 2 m u. Then, Lemma 1 shows that p + q is in the form
(mod 2 2m ) and u 0 is a solution of the modular equation
Plugging this in (5), we get
which can be rewritten as
Fix the known and the unknown parameters as follows
Hence, the equation (6) becomes a 1 x 1 + a 2 x 2 + a 3 x 2 x 4 + a 4 x 3 + a 5 x 3 x 4 + a 6 = 0. Consider the polynomial
is a root of f (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) which can be small enough to be found by Coppersmith's technique. To find the small roots of f (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) using this method, we use the extended strategy of Jochemsz and May [9] . We will need the following bounds.
• max(e 1 , e 2 ) = N γ ,
• p − q = 2 m u with 2 m = N α and α < , otherwise p and q can be found using Coppersmith's metho [4] . Let us fix the bounds of the unknown parameters
Let m and t be two positive integers. Define the set
and the set
Neglecting the coefficients, it is easy to find that f m−1 (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) satisfies
This leads to the characterization of the monomials
We also easily find
Next, define
Without loss of generality, suppose that a 6 = e 1 − e 2 is coprime with R. We define f (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) = a
with (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) ∈ S i for i = 1, 2, 3 where
As shown in [9] , we use the coefficients of g i1,i2,i3,i4 (x 1 X 1 , x 2 X 2 , x 3 X 3 , x 4 X 4 ) and h i1,i2,i3,i4 (x 1 X 1 , x 2 X 2 , x 3 X 3 , x 4 X 4 ) to build a basis of a lattice L with dimension ω = The following ordering of the monomials is performed to construct an upper triangular matrix: if
4 and if i j = i j then the monomials are lexicographically ordered. The diagonal entries of the matrix are of the form
for the polynomials h.
All the polynomials g(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) and h(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) and their combinations share the root
Applying the LLL algorithm to the lattice L with the basis spanned by the polynomials g(x 1 X 1 , x 2 X 2 , x 3 X 3 , x 4 X 4 ) and h(x 1 X 1 , x 2 X 2 , x 3 X 3 , x 4 X 4 ), we get a new basis with short vectors. Let f i (x 1 X 1 , x 2 X 2 , x 3 X 3 , x 4 X 4 ), i = 1, 2, 3 be three short vectors of the reduced basis. Each f i is a combination of g and h, and then share the root
Then, by Theorem 3, we have for i = 1, 2, 3
For i = 1, 2, 3, we force the polynomials f i to satisfy Howgrave-Graham's bound
Substituting the values of X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 from (7) and W from (8), we get
or equivalently, (6 − 24α)τ 2 + (8β + 8δ − 8 − 32α)τ + 4γ + 4β + 8δ − 9 − 12α < 0.
For the optimal value τ = 2(1+4α−β−δ) 3 (1−4α) , this reduces to
which is valid if
Under this condition, we find four polynomials, namely f , f 1 , f 2 and f 3 with the root (
Using the resultant technique, we find the solution
Since N = pq, we get p 2 − 2 m vp − N = 0 which leads to the factorization of the RSA modulus N = pq. This terminates the proof.
Comparison with former attacks
We compare the bound on δ of Theorem 7 with two former bounds, namely the bound obtained by Sarkar and Maitra in [11] and the bound obtained by Sun et al. in [18] . Proof. This is a direct application of Theorem 7 with γ = 1 and α = 0.
In Table 1 , we compare the bound δ < (1 − 4α)(1 − 4α + 6γ). To compare our method with the method of Sun et al., we consider Theorem 7 with β = δ, that is when d 1 and d 2 do not share any amount of their MSBs. We get the following corollary. Corollary 2. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus such that p − q = 2 m u where 2 m ≈ N α . Let e 1 and e 2 be two public exponents satisfying e 1 , e 2 ≈ N γ , and
Proof. In the bound of δ in Theorem 7, if we plug β = δ and solve the inequation for δ, we get the desired bound on δ.
In Table 2 , we compare the largest values of δ of Corollary 2 and the the largest values obtained in [18] for various values of γ = log N (e) and α = log N (2 m ). 
Conclusion
For k ≥ 2 and i = 1, . . . , k, let (N i , e i ) be k RSA instances with k moduli N i = p i q i and k public exponents e i . In this paper, we proposed a new method to factor all the RSA moduli N 1 , . . . , N k in the scenario that the RSA instances satisfy k equations of the shape e i x − y i φ(N i ) = z i or of the shape e i x i − yφ(N i ) = z i with suitably small parameters x i , y i , z i , x, y where φ(N i ) = (p i − 1)(q i − 1). We also proposed an attack on RSA when the prime factors p and q of the RSA modulus N = pq are of the same bit-size. The attack factors N when p and q share a number of their least significant bits (LSBs) in the presence of two public exponents e 1 and e 2 with decryption exponents d 1 and d 2 sharing an amount of their most significant bits (MSBs).
A Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Let ε ∈ (0, 1). Set
where x is the integer greater than or equal to x. Consider the lattice L spanned by the rows of the matrix
where [x] is the nearest integer to x. The determinant of L is det(L) = C n and the dimension is n + 1. Applying the LLL algorithm, we find a reduced basis (b 1 , · · · , b n+1 ) with
Since b 1 ∈ L, we can write b 1 = ±[q, p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ]M , that is
where q > 0. Hence, the norm of b 1 satisfies 
which leads to ε ≥
3·2
(n−4)/4 C 1/(n+1) . As a consequence, we get |qα i − p i | ≤ ε. On the other hand, using (13) and (14) , we get q ≤ 2 n/4 C n/(n+1) ≤ 2 n/4 C n/(n+1) ≤ 2 n(n−3)/4 · 3 n · ε −n . This terminates the proof.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose that p − q = 2 m u. Then p = q + 2 m u and N = q 2 + 2 m uq. Hence 
